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  Kevin Melchionne

Abstract
In this paper I identify a new group of aesthetic norms, which I
call norms of cultivation. Judgments of taste are often
accompanied by forecasts or expectations about future aesthetic
satisfaction. When we find something beautiful, we expect to find
it beautiful in the future. Forecasting is at play in all sorts of
aesthetically motivated behavior. Yet psychologists have
observed an unreliability in such forecasts. As a result of
forecasting error, what we take as our taste can be an unreliable
guide in our aesthetic lives. Compensating for the unreliability of
taste are norms of cultivation, implicit rules for engaging objects,
such as avoiding overexposure to favored objects or exposure
under unfavorable conditions. Norms of cultivation help to
regularize aesthetic experience, mitigating unreliability in
forecasts, and fostering the ongoing stability and coherence of
taste.
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1. Introduction
Judgments of taste are often accompanied by forecasts, in other
words, expectations about future aesthetic satisfaction.[1] When
we find something beautiful, we typically expect to find it
beautiful in the future. Forecasting is at play in many sorts of
aesthetically motivated behavior, from selecting a movie for
online streaming to purchasing a rare masterpiece at auction. To
the extent that we go about our aesthetic lives with confidence
about where we will obtain satisfaction, we rely on forecasts.
Confidence in our forecasts lends a sense of stability and
coherence to taste.
Yet psychologists have observed that, for a variety of reasons,
forecasts are often unreliable.[2] As a result of forecasting error,
our convictions about beauty cannot by themselves guide our
aesthetic choices. They cannot ensure a steady flow of satisfying
aesthetic experiences, a crucial though not exclusive goal of our
aesthetic endeavors. Unreliability in affective forecasting
suggests that something may be wrong, or at least incomplete, in
how philosophers have conceived of the authority of taste in our
aesthetic lives.
From a philosophical perspective, what makes forecasting error
intriguing is that it is intrinsic to experience. Changes in
appraisals of or responses to objects are as natural as the
aesthetic appetite itself. We do not need the influence of mood,
setting, or priming to account for the changes in experience that
make forecasts unreliable (although these additional factors lend
still more complications).[3] Despite such unreliability, taste is
commonly held to be a stable set of convictions. This assumption
about stability is functional in our aesthetic planning. Without
some consistency over time, it is not clear how we would act
aesthetically; no matter how enlightened, our taste would have

no practical meaning in our lives. We would be unable to go out
in the world and derive aesthetic satisfaction, have no sense of
the next movie to watch or book to read. Without forecasts, our
aesthetic lives would be entirely accidental. Our cultural behavior
would be no more than an aimless wandering in a haze of
aesthetic amnesia. For taste to guide our aesthetic lives, there
must be a capacity to forecast. If it makes sense at all to have a
philosophical account of taste, it makes sense to account for both
forecasting and its errors.
To the extent that judgments of taste are accompanied by
forecasts and forecasts are unreliable, how can taste serve as an
influential or reliable guide in aesthetic life? The answer is that
there is a difference between, on the one hand, our convictions
and preferences and, on the other, knowing how to bring about
our aesthetic satisfaction. In other words, there is a difference
between taste and the norms of cultivation. The stability of taste
is maintained in the face of affective change through implicit rules
for engaging objects, such as avoiding overexposure to favored
objects or exposure under unfavorable conditions. Norms of
cultivation are crucial for guiding our choices in the aesthetic
sphere, mitigating some kinds of unreliability in forecasting.
When norms of cultivation are influential, individuals are better
able to avoid forecasting error and to confirm their taste in future
experience. Norms of cultivation optimize aesthetic choices.
They compensate for affective change and forecasting error.
In Sections 2 and 3, I examine aesthetic unreliability through
forecasting error. In Section 4, I discuss video-on-demand, or
streaming, where data indicate a significant role for forecasting
error. In Section 5, I outline the philosophical problem posed by
affective change. In Section 6, I propose the norms of cultivation
as an explanation for the coherence and stability of taste in the
face of affective change. In Section 7, I discuss the broader
implications of the norms of cultivation for the aesthetic self.
2. Forecasts
Psychologists observe that we are skillful at predicting whether
events will be, in a general way, pleasant or unpleasant but that
we tend to overestimate the intensity and duration of the feelings
that future events will cause. Even when we know what a future
event will entail, we have difficulty knowing how much
satisfaction we will derive from it and whether the satisfaction will
be worth the effort expended to bring it about. The strongest
tendency is to overestimate the impact of future events.
Consequently, we often engage in events that do not make us as
happy as we thought they would. By the same token,
disappointments in the future do not impact us as negatively as
we tend to fear they will. Failed predictions are common in, for
instance, romance, career choice, and shopping. Likewise, in the
aesthetic realm, our judgments of taste are often accompanied by
forecasts. When we find something beautiful, satisfying, or
approve of it, we generally expect to find it beautiful, satisfying or
worthy of approval tomorrow, next week, and in the distant
future. However, failed predictions are common in the aesthetic
realm, too.
Forecasts are an empirical feature of beliefs about satisfaction
and suffering. A forecast may or may not accompany a
judgment. It is not “analytic” in the judgment; the judgment
does not entail a forecast in any logical sense. Forecasting can

improve with education and experience, though learning is
inhibited by the difficulty of accurately recalling our past
experience. Our ability to accurately recall past reactions is beset
by many of the same biases that undermine our forecasts. For
instance, in recalling prior events, it is common to exaggerate our
reactions just as we do in anticipation of future events.[4]
Forecasts play a greater role in some judgments than in others
because the assessment of future satisfaction is more crucial. At
an auto dealership, consideration of the purchase of a luxury car
would likely be strongly colored by a forecast. With cheaper
models available, it would be hard to imagine making a purchase
without the expectation of many years of future satisfaction. The
stakes are high because the buyer will be locking in a certain
experience to the exclusion of others. That forecast is crucial to
the purchase; the driver makes a forecast as part of the
evaluation. But, leaving the theater after a play that will not be
produced again for many years, a forecast will have little practical
significance and is not likely to be entertained. A forecast is
possible, but not necessary.
3. Explanations for unreliable forecasting
There are several explanations for the unreliability of forecasting.
They are non-exclusive and mutually reinforcing. Together, they
create considerable headwinds for the forecaster. These
explanations apply to all sorts of forecasts, including those
involving aesthetic objects. Inaccurate forecasts are sometimes
caused by what is termed construal bias, a failure to frame the
future event accurately. We base our forecast on the memory of
a prior event but we misremember it, focusing overly on the most
intense parts, as well as the beginning and end, at the expense of
the overall experience.[5] Events can be so complex that we fail
to grasp the variety of ways that they could influence us in the
future.[6] We also have a tendency to overestimate the impact
of future events.[7] Focal bias causes us to think of future
events in isolation, without assessing their impact in the context
of other factors that might mitigate that impact.[8] We may fear
some future situation, such as the possible loss of a loved one,
because of the suffering it promises but we may not consider how
other aspects of our lives or how other capacities we have will
influence us and foster our resilience. Strong responses, either
positive or negative, can trigger reactive processes that
counteract or compensate for specific emotions. For instance,
ego depletion caused by anxiety or stress may trigger egoreinforcing activities like socializing, shopping, or eating.[9]
Sometimes, the process is far simpler: as time passes, the event
simply fails to preoccupy us as anticipated.[10]
Most significantly, we underestimate the power of hedonic or
affective adaptation. Affective adaptation is the tendency of our
feelings, either positive or negative, to diminish in intensity over
time. Affective responses are weakened by anticipation and
strengthened by novelty.[11] When we are exposed to an object,
we know better what to expect of it in the future; consequently,
our future response will be weaker. Indeed, the very act of
anticipating how we might feel about a certain experience is a
way of becoming accustomed to the experience, a form of
adaptation that can reduce its impact. Familiarity with an event
also reduces its impact because the original event becomes a new
baseline for experience that future experiences must surpass to

induce pleasure.[12] Moreover, the very process of making sense
of an experience can drain it of affective power, reducing the
extraordinary to the ordinary.[13]
Affective adaptation is pervasive. It explains why favorite meals
become boring when consumed too frequently and the greatest of
novels do not usually sustain more than a couple of readings over
a lifetime. Hedonic adaptation means that our pleasures and
disappointments are not fixed. They change over time so that
often, but not always, their impact on us diminishes. Affective
adaptation explains the famous hedonic treadmill whereby
individuals are compelled to continually seek out new sources of
pleasure due to the waning influence of past sources. It is
important for philosophers to avoid miscasting terms like hedonic
treadmill and affective adaptation in terms of atomistic sensation,
isolated events of pleasure and pain. Instead, psychologists see
them in terms of the individual’s ongoing efforts to sustain
positive mood, self-appraisal, and flourishing. The hedonic
treadmill is a deep-seated human tendency, through which, to
one degree or another, we re-orient ourselves continually to new
objects in order to sustain mood. Mood is range-bound, existing
in a dynamic equilibrium. On a day-to-day basis, our place in the
range may vary but rarely exceed or fall below it for long. By
adapting to changes in circumstances, we tend to return to our
hedonic range. To remain in the upper part of the range, we
must run on the treadmill. Researchers in well-being consider
affective adaption one of the greatest challenges to remaining on
the higher end of one’s hedonic range.[14]
If the hedonic treadmill exists, then, in so far as our aesthetic
lives are motivated by a desire for better moods and more
satisfying experiences, there must also be an aesthetic treadmill.
The aesthetic treadmill reflects the tendency for aesthetic
satisfaction to ebb over time, motivating us to seek out new
sources of experience to maintain current levels of aesthetic
pleasure. Of course, our aesthetic lives are not entirely defined
by the aesthetic treadmill. However, we cannot appeal to a priori
theories of aesthetic judgment to settle the question.
Psychologists tell us that individuals are constantly working to
bring themselves to the higher end of their hedonic range.
In this paper, I assume that the aesthetic component of our lives
is marked by the same efforts. Even as we run on the treadmill,
our awareness of motivation is often limited. In this respect,
some folks contend with hedonic change better than others,
avoiding ruts of boredom through a predisposition to new
experiences. Their curious nature pushes them back to the top
of their hedonic range. Others are less given to hedonic
adaptation, meaning that their treadmill runs slower or perhaps
scarcely moves. They are capable of maintaining themselves at
the higher end of their hedonic range with less reliance on
novelty. In either case, the judicious use of the aesthetic
treadmill reflects a kind of emotional skillfulness or sensibility, a
tacit knowledge of what is required to remain on the higher end
of one’s hedonic range. The aesthetic treadmill illustrates how,
even as forecasts remain unreliable, we can develop habits that
reflect some degree of anticipation of the limited future utility of
current satisfactions. These habits are often embedded in cultural
practices that guide us toward optimal experiences. In other
words, we program a certain flow of novelty through regular
travel, entertainment, reading, and outings. Each of us balances

novelty and familiarity. Old pleasures are never entirely defunct.
They can be revived after they lose their original familiarity,
allowing us to return to objects holding canonical places in our
taste and lending a cyclical character to our aesthetic lives.
4. Forecasting error in aesthetic experience
There is probably something powerfully adaptive for human
beings in the tendency toward exaggerated predictions of future
satisfaction or dissatisfaction.[15] If unreliable affective
forecasting is as common as researchers believe, we should
expect to find it influencing the consumption of art. Errors in
affective forecasting occur with all sorts of choices, from complex
ones like marriage to simple ones like purchases. In a world of
poor forecasting, it would be remarkable if the consumption of
culture was somehow exempt. Art lovers can underestimate the
rapidity of hedonic adaptation to a painting or a song just as
newlyweds can to a sofa set. And, focal bias can occur when, for
instance, we overestimate the long-term impact of an initial
cultural encounter, say, reading a certain novel. We are at risk of
failing to see how subsequent novels relativize the initial
experience, creating a broader perspective and weaker impact for
the first novel.
But how common is forecasting error in aesthetic experience?
Error in forecasting is not easy to test for because it requires
ongoing exposure to a controlled stimulus over time. It would be
difficult to design an experimental setting. Nevertheless,
forecasting error is evident in large data sets of cultural behavior
such as video-on-demand (VOD) or streaming. Most research on
VOD is designed to serve the needs of system designers seeking
to render streaming more efficient by anticipating user patterns.
The databases may also serve as a compelling natural experiment
for aesthetic behavior.
Among the most widely discussed findings from VOD and other
online shopping data is what has been termed the long tail.[16]
When it comes to the most popular videos, VOD downloads look
much like rental patterns at the now defunct bricks-and-mortar
retailers: at any moment, there is a narrow list of extremely
popular movies with many downloads. But beyond the most
popular titles, downloads fall precipitously, following a Zipf
distribution. At the bottom of the curve for VOD, there is an
extremely long tail of many obscure videos that are each
accessed just a few times. The long tail indicates that, alongside
the blockbusters, there exists a broad appetite for out-of-way
options. With negligible storage costs, video-on-demand permits
a deeper inventory than a bricks-and-mortar rental store. At the
same time, monthly subscription plans mean that viewers are not
financially constrained in their viewing. Consequently, VOD
services can offer a wide variety of obscure titles, each garnering
just a few downloads.
Besides the number of downloads, a significant difference
between popular films and those on the long tail lies in the cancel
rate, that is, the rate at which viewers interrupt the
download.[17] In comparing long tail to popular usage,
researchers observe that the cancel rate is significantly higher for
popular films than for obscure ones. Overall cancel rates are
remarkably high in VOD; 86% of all sessions are cancelled prior
to completion. Most sessions are cancelled within the first 10
minutes and more than a third of sessions do not even last five

minutes. In contrast, people walk out of live performances and
movie theaters very rarely. These findings reveal how common
disappointment is in an environment of unconstrained
consumption. Instead of an anomaly, it is the rule.
Two ready explanations can be dismissed. The first is that
popular films are less satisfying than obscure films; obscure films
do not, in general, receive higher ratings than more popular
ones. Popularity and high ratings go hand in hand, despite the
higher cancel rate. A second explanation is that viewers of
obscure movies are a different group of viewers with different
viewing habits. Evidence indicates that although there are users
with a tendency to watch obscure films, popular offerings
nevertheless constitute the overwhelming majority of their
selections, too.[18] Like those who restrict themselves to
popular films, these viewers tend to rate popular films higher
than obscure ones. If there is a lurking army of nerdy cinephiles,
they do not seem to reach statistical significance.
Affective forecasting error represents a third explanation. At any
given moment, the popular movies on a VOD service are usually
the ones with recent theatrical releases. Thus, they are more
likely to have already been seen by the audience. Greater
satisfaction at the initial viewing may account for repeated
viewings. But these repeated viewings disappoint at a higher
rate, leading to cancellation: “people watching the most popular
videos are likely to have seen them before, either in another
medium (theater or DVD) or in a prior VOD session. Therefore,
they lose interest more easily during the movie, resulting in
shorter session times.”[19]
There are two relevant observations about the cancel rate
phenomenon. First, it illustrates how hedonic adaptation can play
a significant role in aesthetic behavior, at least when it comes to
narratives (it is probably less influential with music). Here, on a
fairly large scale, we get a glimpse of the influence of unreliable
affective forecasting in cultural consumption. Second, even as
viewers cancel repeat viewings at a higher rate than initial
viewings, it is important to observe that most viewers avoid
repeat viewings altogether. Wandering out on the long tail, they
prefer a new film at each session, even though they cannot be
sure that the new film will deliver as much pleasure as the films
already seen. Intuitively, viewers of new films recognize that the
lower rated film will deliver greater satisfaction on a first viewing
than a better rated film on the second. In this avoidance of
repetition lies an acknowledgement of hedonic adaptation and the
aesthetic treadmill. The cancellation rate phenomenon does
exist: a certain portion of the population is in fact unaware of
hedonic adaptation. At the same time, by seeking out obscure
titles on the “long tail” rather than watching what they have
already seen in the theaters, many people evade hedonic
adaptation.
As an aside, the cancel rate phenomenon also suggests that the
transactional status of an aesthetic experience—that is, the mode
of payment—may be more influential than aestheticians have
allowed. When paying “a la carte,” as one does at the theater, or
with pay per view, viewers are much less likely to abandon a
session. But when viewers are not paying for each film
separately, dissatisfaction is higher. With remarkably high rates
of cancellation among VOD subscribers, the unconstrained

consumption of the subscription model introduces new questions
about aesthetic satisfaction. Does this difference illustrate the
power of the sunk cost bias, that is, the tendency to continue to
invest based on the degree of past investment rather than
expected return? Or does direct payment somehow compel us to
be more appreciative, and enjoy the cultural product that we
have purchased? The difference between responses to a la carte
and subscription based consumption illustrates how the
transactional status of a cultural experience changes our
responses and our behavior. Unconstrained consumption seems
to make us more dissatisfied with any particular offering. The
difference suggests that, if cultural consumers want to remain at
the higher end of their hedonic range, they should exercise
caution in situations of unconstrained consumption typical of the
age of the internet. As we shall see, unconstrained consumption
violates a norm of cultivation (avoiding overexposure) and is
likely to erode satisfaction.
5. Forecasting taste
When I make a judgment of taste, I am making an affectdependent judgment. Affect dependency means that the
appraisal is colored to some degree with emotion, pleasure,
feeling, a psychological response with which the judgment is
entwined. Among aestheticians, there is some question about
the nature of the affect dependency of aesthetic judgments.
From the beginning of the discipline, philosophers have held that
aesthetic judgments were distinctive in that they were premised
on a subjective feeling. However, the nature of that feeling has
long been a source of difficulty because the role and influence of
feeling is unanswerable on an a priori basis. Even as aesthetic
judgments have an affective dimension, there is no invariant
relationship between affect and judgment.
In light of the richness and complexity of aesthetic life, one
cannot “make an argument” for any particular role for affect. The
influence of affect upon a judgment can vary by virtue of any
number of conditions, such as individual, setting, artistic intention
or genre, cultural background, or kind of affect, to name just a
few. The concept of affect is itself capacious and unwieldy
though without a superior alternative. The possibilities for the
relationship between affect and judgment are daunting, and there
is no way to sort out the complex role of affect in aesthetic
judgments merely by appealing to an a priori model, as
philosophers routinely do. Nevertheless, in every theory of taste
there must be a degree of affect dependency. Thus, the
aesthetician can neither appeal to an a priori model nor side-step
the problem by claiming that problems of affect, welldocumented by psychologists, have no bearing on aesthetic
theory. Aestheticians occupy terrain far more complex than
typically acknowledged.
It is possible to assess the role of affect in judgment by looking at
empirical studies designed to capture the influence of affect under
a variety of conditions. Admittedly, this is a challenging project;
it is an open question as to how applicable contemporary
psychological research is to aesthetic theory. However, I dismiss
out of hand the view that there is nothing to learn from the
efforts of the psychologists. Instead, the intuition guiding this
paper is that the findings have implications for a range of
theories of taste. The challenge for philosophers is to assess and

apply the research appropriately.
Affective responses are intrinsically unstable over repeated
exposures; they change over time. Nevertheless, the judgments
of taste typically carry a sense of time-independence, that is, an
expectation that the current level of satisfaction is not likely to
change dramatically. As we discussed, this expectation is rooted
in the psychology of beliefs about future affective states. To one
extent or another, there is a natural, dynamic gap between, on
the one hand, our real affective responses to objects over time
and, on the other, our convictions about value.
Individuals tend to believe that their aesthetic experience is more
stable than it really is, for the impact of an object is likely to
change over multiple exposures. Contending with this tension is
a significant aspect of our aesthetic life over time. In so far as
my taste depends on the quality of the affect, must it change as
well? Given the potential for forecasting error, how do we explain
our aesthetic lives over time? In other words, if taste is affectdependent but time-invariant, how is it possible? Is it reasonable
to conceive of a well-ordered, richly affective aesthetic life with
stable taste? If so, how?
Call this the problem of intrasubjective validity. We can
understand this problem through an analogy to the expectation of
intersubjective consensus that has puzzled aestheticians since
before Hume and Kant. A judgment of beauty often comes with
an expectation of intersubjective agreement, a conviction that
others should agree. And, I am included in this intersubjective
claim in the future. The classic puzzle of intersubjective validity
is why I should expect other discerning people to find beautiful
what I find beautiful. Likewise, the puzzle of intrasubjective
validity is why I should expect myself to find beautiful in the
future what I find beautiful today.
6. Norms of cultivation
Norms of cultivation help us to find beautiful in the future what
we find beautiful today. Aesthetic experience must be marked
with at least a veneer of stability over time. Otherwise, as we
observed earlier, aesthetic life would not be possible. Norms of
cultivation are intuitive rules of thumb, aptitudes, skills, and
tactics that nurture or sustain aesthetic experience. They afford
to our preferences stability over time that they might otherwise
lack. Among the norms of cultivation are avoiding overexposure,
controlling of the setting for experience, and responding to
appetite. It is likely that there are others.
Rather than compromise aesthetic experience, norms of
cultivation guide us to structure it so as to maximize the
coherence of taste over time, helping us to remain appropriately
connected to ongoing sources of satisfaction. Norms of
cultivation anticipate hedonic change and work to lessen its
impact. They help to regularize our encounters over time, keep
forecasts true, and in so doing help to ensure the stability of
taste.
Reliance on norms of cultivation is a competency that mitigates
the influence of affective adaptation and other sources of
aesthetic disappointment. This competency is often but not
necessarily tacit. Individuals may acquire an awareness of the
cycles of satisfaction and consciously orchestrate their exposure

to aesthetic objects to optimize experience. These norms allow
us to frame experience so as to ensure the sustainability of
ongoing sources of satisfaction and secure new sources of
pleasure at an appropriate rate. They illustrate how our aesthetic
choices, though guided in part by taste, rely on other
competencies. By itself, taste is inadequate for aesthetically
satisfying life.
Examples of norms of cultivation:
1. “Don’t overdo it:” the norm of exposure control
We have observed that affective adaptation is one of the greatest
challenges to ongoing aesthetic satisfaction. Aesthetic pleasure
waxes and wanes. It is “lumpy” and can “wear out.” Future
satisfaction is not guaranteed by past satisfaction. When exposed
to the same aesthetic objects over time, we tend not have
continually confirming experiences. What I like today is not a
reliable predictor what I will like in the future. Indeed, the very
energy with which I pursue a current preference may result in
overexposure, preparing the way for its later waning.
To avoid affective adaptation, we must control the frequency of
our exposure to preferred objects. We keep our experience vital
by avoiding overexposure to any single object, no matter how
favored. By itself, taste does not protect us from affective
adaptation. If we blindly followed our taste, we would not be able
to set up the best occasions for experience on an ongoing basis.
On the contrary, we would soon begin to dislike and disapprove of
what our taste blindly tells us we like and approve of. But, when
we vary our exposure, we intuitively reduce the risk of hedonic
adaptation and increase the likelihood that we “confirm” our taste
in subsequent exposures. To avoid wearing out current sources
of satisfaction, we seek out new ones. There is an intuitive
“discipline of variation,” an enforced rotation of aesthetic objects,
or to use Apple’s terminology, a “shuffle.” It is not an accident
that the shuffle function is among the most popular features in
the IPod. It builds upon a natural need for balance between
familiarity and surprise. When not provided automatically by a
machine, the shuffle is a substantive skill that we must develop.
We revisit old standbys in the context of this ongoing discipline of
variation.
Exposure control is visible at the social level in the regular
recycling of styles and artistic reputations. The sometimes cruel
cycles of artistic fashion are a sign of the norm of exposure
control at work. Revivals can be seen as the norm of exposure
control returning to visibility artists or styles from the past made
new by oblivion.
2. “Set the right ambience:” The norm of context control
Works of art—some more than others—require a certain setting
to be appreciated. To optimize experience, the individual must
control the context of the experience as much as the way he or
she attends the object. The setting may include the physical
environment, the time or season, personal energy (for instance,
avoiding fatigue, hunger).
I once had the privilege of visiting the home of a prominent
Philadelphia collector who was eager to show off a wall sculpture
by Donald Judd. Though on a posh street south of Rittenhouse

Square, the collector’s home was nevertheless a classic
Philadelphia row house, and the rooms were accordingly small.
My companion and I were brought up the stairs and into an
ordinary bedroom where, between the wall and a large bed, we
leaned over the Judd and took in its shiny and expensive
surface. Among the other pieces of furniture in the room, the
Judd sculpture seemed to be no more than an especially austere
console, ready for a tray of scotch, tumbler glasses and an ice
bucket. What the collector missed, of course, was the physical
environment for the work. One cannot sit down on the edge of a
king-sized mattress in the small bedroom of an early nineteenthcentury house and expect to appreciate a Donald Judd from the
1970s hanging three feet from one’s nose. It was simply not the
right ambience for the work.
If you ever worried about undermining a preference by engaging
it under inappropriate conditions, you’ve dealt with context
control. It is best to look at minimalist art in spare galleries,
which enhance the aesthetic of the work. By the same token, it
is probably not worth ordering take-out gourmet sushi only to eat
it slumped against a wall at the bus terminal. Rather than taste,
it is the norm of context control that leads us to avoid the bus
station and better secure our satisfaction at the sushi bar.
3. “Scratch the right itch:” the norm of fancy
Errors in forecast often are caused by failing to account for the
influence of fancy, in other words, the cycles of curiosity or
inclination that make us more interested and more easily satisfied
at one moment than another. Fancy means our predisposition at
any moment to want to have aesthetic experiences of a certain
sort (or not to have them all). Our aesthetic lives are not spent
making aesthetic judgments about objects that come to us
arbitrarily. Instead, our energy is spent hunting down the objects
that we are in the mood to experience. We do not merely want
to have experience; instead, we are optimizers or satisficers,
forsaking what interests us less in favor what we think might
interest us more. Aesthetic competency involves, in part, having
an adequate—though still vague—sense of what we want to
experience. If the local theater only has adolescent blockbusters
on its screens, we drive to the next town for the Iranian feature
reviewed on National Public Radio. We tailor our Netflix queue so
that the movies we really want to see are next in line. We read
travel guides and cookbooks to see what most strikes our fancy.
In these actions, our aesthetic experience is prefaced by an
appetite, hankering, yen, penchant, or itch. Then, in a kind of
happy confirmation bias, we engage in the experiences that we
believe will satisfy our appetite. It is not so much what we like or
what we approve of but what we feel like doing that offers
satisfaction. If we are not in the correct frame of mind, then we
may judge a work of art unfavorably without being able to
acknowledge that, in fact, it is the influence of appetite or mood
that drives the judgment.
7. Norms of cultivation as aesthetic self-regulation
The answer to the question of how we can expect ourselves to
find beautiful tomorrow what we find beautiful today may, in part,
lie in simply accepting that sometimes we will not be able to
secure ongoing, stable, predictable satisfaction from our preferred
aesthetic objects. It is not reasonable to expect forecasts to
always work. Our aesthetic lives are full of disappointment and

confusion. We misinterpret the sources of our satisfaction and
chase the false promises offered by reviews, samples, and
reproductions, wasting time and energy on misguided aesthetic
explorations. We are distracted by extraneous stimuli and
primed by the influence of authoritative opinion. We ruin our
preferences by overdoing them. We do not take heed of the
influence of our moods. We do not pay enough attention to
setting up the right conditions for experience. There is a churn in
aesthetic life, a swirl of appetite, curiosity, and familiarity.
Sometimes, it adds up to no more than aimless wandering.
On the other hand, if I abide by the norms of cultivation, that is
to say, if I avoid overexposing myself to familiar sources of
pleasure, take care to engage works within the appropriate
context, and follow my fancy, then chances are better that I will
be less vulnerable to forecasting error. With more aesthetic
success, I will gravitate to the higher end of my hedonic range
and, overall, have a more satisfying aesthetic life. If I disregard
the norms of cultivation, I will undermine my experience by
engaging works when I cannot be expected to really enjoy them.
Ineffective at this self-regulation, I will likely have less than an
optimal aesthetic life, continually confronting boredom or
overstimulation without any sense of the right “recipe” for my
disposition.
What we experience as the stability of taste over time rests in
part on the norms of cultivation. The norms of cultivation help to
impart stability to preferences by helping us to encounter works
of art under favorable conditions. Through the norms of
cultivation, we are more likely to encounter aesthetic objects on
terms favorable to satisfaction. To remain at the higher end of
one’s hedonic range (with more satisfaction and more accurate
hedonic forecasts), an individual must build the norms of
cultivation into his or her cultural habits. Norms of cultivation
help to stabilize taste and are the mark of a well-organized and
skillful aesthetic life, that is, a cultivated life. In a vital aesthetic
life, norms of cultivation work alongside taste, tailoring it to
optimize experience.
The norms of cultivation are valuable for this optimization alone.
However, norms of cultivation also play a role in the construction
of personality and character. When we speak of what it means to
be a cultivated person, we mean more than a capacity to judge
and interpret. An aesthetic personality is composed not just of
preferences or convictions. It is not just an aggregation of
judgments of taste. The aesthetic self is also marked by a
certain application of the norms of cultivation. Like our taste, this
application of the norms of cultivation reflects our disposition or
sensibility; it characterizes us. For instance, each of us may be
predisposed to a certain pace of new or familiar stimulius, i.e.,
the norm of exposure control. This pace may be as crucial to our
aesthetic well-being as any taste convictions we might harbor.
The extent to which we vary favored aesthetic objects, establish
appropriate settings, or follow our appetite or mood, says as
much about who we are as aesthetic persons as our taste
convictions.
In this way, the norms of cultivation help us to understand what
our aesthetic lives add up to over time. Once again, we have to
move carefully from the psychological formulation to the
aesthetic one, in this case from the concept of affective or

hedonic regulation to aesthetic regulation. Affective regulation
denotes the varied processes by which individuals seek to control
the emotions that they have.[20] It is sometimes called
“emotional intelligence,” a term that which has entered the
popular lexicon in recent years. Affective regulation can involve,
for instance, selecting the kinds of situations we put ourselves in,
modifying them, determining the strength and nature of
attention, controlling responses, and determining our attitudes.
Likewise, the norms of cultivation are a means of aesthetic selfregulation, through rules for engaging objects.
The main part of what it takes to be an aesthetically skillful
person, a cultivated person, is not so much the ability to make
right judgments about aesthetic objects as the ability to secure
aesthetic regulation through the norms of cultivation. In our
aesthetic lives, we are not for the most part judges seeking to
determine whether the works of art that come before us are good
or bad, like a juror in a piano competition. Instead, we are
optimizers or satisficers looking to secure greater aesthetic
satisfaction from the objects that we pursue, in other words, like
a browser on Netflix. We seek out the objects that we believe
offer that satisfaction and cast our attitude in the best way to
procure it. More hunters than game wardens, we are looking for
experiences that are likely to satisfy our appetite. Aesthetic skill
or cultivation is a matter of slanting our exposure and attitudes in
ways that promote this satisfaction. Aesthetic autonomy amounts
above all to the pursuit and gratification of appetite.
8. Conclusion
To read in aesthetics, one might infer that our aesthetic lives are
on a happy, one-way street of ever more astute judgment and
ever greater aesthetic satisfaction. Our aesthetic lives are all
unmitigated success stories, complicated only by the occasional
work of conceptual art. Aesthetic experience is never marked by
ambivalence about our feelings or confusion as to its causes. We
are never disappointed by our favorites. We never get bored.
After reading in aesthetics, one would have to conclude that the
process of trying to grasp our feelings and apply them to future
aesthetic choices—the whole churning tumult of our enthusiasms
—lacks any complication worthy of theoretical scrutiny. We
simply behold and judge.
Aesthetic theory needs to address the challenges posed by a
more complicated psychology of taste, where modes of aesthetic
attention are mediated not just by cognition, but also by complex
psychological tendencies like forecasting error and hedonic
adaptation. Norms of cultivation suggest a more comprehensive
approach to taste and aesthetic experience offers a better picture
of aesthetic life. This approach may help us to better understand
how the aesthetic values play authoritative roles in the real
rhythms of aesthetic life.
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